BackgroundConflict in Iraq has displaced millions of refugee youth. Warzone exposure and forced migration have unique acute and chronic impacts on youth, yet effects of exposure may not be universal across diverse refugee groups. Understanding how youth from various refugee groups are differentially affected by stress and trauma is critical to allocate resources and implement screening measures with the goal of providing early intervention.MethodTo identify the effects of warzone exposure and forced migration, a convenience sample of 48 Iraqi refugee youth (...) ages 6–17 was assessed within the first month of arrival to the United States. Youth provided self-reported severity of posttraumatic stress and anxiety symptoms; symptom severity was then compared with an existing sample of 135 Syrian refugee youth to explore whether refugee youth of different nationalities experience the same effects of warzone exposure and forced migration. These data are the baseline for a longitudinal developmental study of refugee health, which also includes parental data.ResultsSeverity of separation anxiety and negative alterations in cognition and mood were the greatest symptomatic concerns in Iraqi refugee youth. Thirty-eight percent of responding Iraqi youth showed possible indication of an anxiety disorder. Severity of posttraumatic stress symptoms was lower in Iraqi youth compared to Syrian youth. For both Iraqi and Syrian refugee youth, separation anxiety was the most significant concern, with more than 80% of both samples showing a possible indication of clinically significant separation anxiety.ConclusionThe present observational study indicated that Iraqi refugee youth experience a range of anxiety and posttraumatic stress symptoms following warzone exposure and forced migration; posttraumatic stress symptoms were less severe in Iraqi versus Syrian youth. Comparing refugee youth of different nationalities is of particular importance, as our results demonstrate that findings from one refugee population cannot easily be generalized to another. Clinical and research efforts should prioritize interventions to address separation anxiety in refugee youth, which was of concern in both samples. (shrink)

Donation after cardiac death (CDC) is an important issue in the spiritual care and hospital chaplaincy ministry to patients, staff, and families in the Pittsburgh Mercy Health System. Key members of the interdisciplinary care teams must be well informed about the facts of this controversial issue. Ethical decisions made in particular cases contribute to the development of hospital policies and the establishment of “best practices” in large Catholic health care systems throughout the United States, and must be made with the (...) utmost care. This article provides a brief history and overview of donation after cardiac death and discusses the major ethical issues that were addressed during CDC policy development for the Pittsburgh Mercy Health System. The issues center on questions of whether donors are really dead. Specific issues include death criteria, including the time of pronouncement of death; conflicts of interest; treatment of patients and their loved ones; and organ preservation techniques. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 7.3 (Autumn 2007): 527–543. (shrink)

By means of a critical reinterpretation of the famous short story by Herman Melville titled “Bartleby, the Scrivener,” I propose a psycho-anthropological explanation of work behaviors, relationships in work environments, and their psychopathological repercussions. The article notably examines behaviors and work relationships connecting them as outcomes of single individuals' efforts to mentalize ideological–cultural models determining them in a given historical moment. A reductively individualistic interpretation is criticized, which is typically present in clinical and work psychology and ascribes to the single (...) person presumed psychical deficits and exclusively looks in his/her personal history for causes of disadaptive behaviors and antecedents of psychopathological formations. (shrink)

Research on bodily awareness has focused on body illusions with an aim to explore the possible dissociation of our bodily awareness from our own body. It has provided insights into how our sensory modalities shape our sense of embodiment, and it has raised important questions regarding the malleability of our sense of ownership over our own body. The issue, however, is that this research fails to consider an important distinction in how we experience our body. There are indeed two ways (...) in which we can be aware of our body: via observational awareness, which involves attending to the body as an object, and via non-observational awareness, where the body is given as the subject of experience and does not involve attention. The research to date has focused on the former—observational bodily awareness—and has left the latter—non-observational bodily awareness—in the dark. This is detrimental to ever formulating a complete account of how we are aware of our body. It is understandable, however, because of the inherent problem in studying non-observational bodily awareness: how would you instruct subjects to report on their unattended bodily awareness? In view to resolving this problem, I propose here a working hypothesis on the basis of research on interoception and the rubber hand illusion, and on the effect of meditation on awareness and attention. This working hypothesis can show us a way to begin studying non-observational bodily awareness, and finally build a complete theory of bodily awareness. (shrink)

Traditionally, philosophers of mind have been guided by a brainbound approach: the mind, whatever it turns out to be, will be related to or identical with the brain. The body, under this approach, plays a merely instrumental role — it is what keeps the brain alive and healthy. Over the past few decades there has been increasing resistance to the brainbound approach, and a strongly supported push for taking a non-brainbound approach: the body is not merely instrumental, but in many (...) ways constitutive of the mind — the mind, whatever it turns out to be, is bodily in many fundamental respects. Thus, in explaining the mind, we must consider not only brain states, but also wider bodily processes. What those wider bodily processes are, and how they constitute certain mental states, are the key questions that we now face as non-brainbound philosophers of mind. -/- One avenue of investigation that many have taken in view to answering these two questions has been to look at bodily awareness and its relation to our sense of self. How does our body, and our awareness of our body more specifically, constitute our sense of self and our subjective experience of the world. A clear way of investigating this last question is to turn to pathological cases of body awareness, e.g. body dysmorphic disorder and anorexia nervosa. Anorexia nervosa is an interesting case. The DSM-5 distinguishes anorexia nervosa from body dysmorphic disorder — the former is classified as an eating disorder, while the latter is classified as a mental disorder. As I will explore in this chapter, this very manner of distinguishing among such pathologies admits of a traditional brainbound approach to separating the mind/brain from the body. Here I shall consider how a non-brainbound approach might give us different, and perhaps even better insight into cases such as anorexia nervosa, and I shall, conversely, consider how such body awareness disorders might serve to further strengthen the view that the right approach to understanding the mind is the non-brainbound approach. (shrink)

El artículo expone las limitaciones que el liberalismo de Nozick presenta para sancionar ciertas conductas omisivas. Los postulados de su obra «Anarquía, Estado y utopía» fundamentan una concepción negativa de la libertad y, en consecuencia, asientan los pilares de un «Estado mínimo» que protege a sus ciudadanos, esencialmente, contra las agresiones de terceros. De esta forma, el texto expone que dichos postulados permiten la imposición de prohibiciones, pero no tanto de obligaciones (normas de mandato o «normas de hacer»). Se vislumbra (...) de este modo que el liberalismo nozickiano adolece de obstáculos teóricos para sancionar algunas conductas omisivas que ocasionan o permiten peligros y resultados especialmente graves. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:666 Feminist Studies 44, no. 3. © 2018 by Feminist Studies, Inc. Lana Dee Povitz To See and Be Seen: In Conversation with JEB August 12, 2017; a hot, bright morning. Ariel and I disembark at the train station in Takoma, DC, and head toward the waiting car. In the driver’s seat is one of the most important photographers of lesbian lives in the United States, Joan E. (...) Biren, popularly known as JEB. Decades before social media made images of nearly anything accessible to nearly anyone with a web connection, JEB published Eye to Eye: Portraits of Lesbians in 1979—in her words, “The first lesbian [photography] book that was going to say LESBIAN on the cover and have real people with real faces and first names on the inside.”1 A videographer later in her career, JEB made her mark traveling around the country in the late 1970s and early 1980s with her Dyke Show.2 Formally titled Lesbian Images in Photograph : 1850–the present, this constantly evolving visual and audio performance featured between three hundred and four hundred slides of lesbians or lesbian-like women from 1850 to the present.3 At the crest 1. Joan E. Biren, phone interview with Ariel Goldberg, October 10, 2017. Transcript in author’s possession. 2. JEB toured with the Dyke Show in the United States and Canada from 1979 to 1985. See Sophie Hackett, “Queer Looking,” Aperture 218 (Spring 2015): 40–45. 3. Ibid. On “lesbian-like” women and finding lesbians throughout history before the consolidation of the identity category, see Judith M. Bennett, “‘Lesbian-Like’ and the Social History of Lesbianisms,” Journal of the History of Sexuality 9, nos. 1–2 (January–April 2000): 1–24; David M. Halperin, “The First Homosexuality?” in his How to Do the History of Homosexuality Lana Dee Povitz 667 of the women’s liberation movement, audiences crowded together wherever they could to see the show—in living rooms, garages, church basements, community centers, and feminist bookstores—sitting rapt on the ground or on folding chairs. For many in these all-women spaces, JEB’s slides were the first images of women like them they’d ever seen. It’s Ariel who has arranged today’s interview, doing research for the book they’re writing about the influence of the twentieth century’s LGBTQ photographers on contemporary mainstream image culture. Ariel Goldberg is a photographer and poet who crisscrosses New York City working as an adjunct on different college campuses. The more they tell me about JEB in the weeks leading up to this meeting, the more I sense something genealogical afoot. Each representing the white, Jewish, middle -class,antiracist-lesbian-grassroots activism of their respective eras, both JEB and Ariel are self-taught, collaborative, and accountable to their circles of activist/artist friends. They pursue projects with or without (usually without) institutional support and brim with interests that hover between marginal and hot. As for me, I’m a historian, tagging along for the ride. I know little about photography, its practitioners, or its technologies, but I’m dipping into a new research project about the impact of social-movement participation on activist lives. And, aware of JEB’s role as a documentarian of (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2002): 48–80; Leila Rupp, Sapphistries : A Global History of Love Between Women (New York: New York University Press, 2011); Valerie Traub, Thinking Sex with the Early Moderns (Philadelphia : University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016). See also Cait McKinney, “‘Finding the Lines to My People’: Media History of Queer Bibliographic Encounter,” GLQ: Journal of Gay and Lesbian Studies 24, no. 1 (January 2018): 55–83. For a discussion of queer desire for belonging based in literature, see Christopher Nealon, Foundlings: Lesbian and Gay Historical Emotion Before Stonewall (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001).  Ariel Goldberg, by Lana Dee Povitz. 668 Lana Dee Povitz social justice movements, including women’s and gay liberation, as well as her theoretical contributions to the early lesbian-separatist collective known as the Furies Collective, I am curious what this veteran activist life looks like now. Ariel and I speculated about JEB on the ride down from New York. We know she... (shrink)

Motor development – traditionally studied in WEIRD populations – falls victim to assumptions of universality similar to other domains described by Henrich et al. However, cross-cultural research illustrates the extraordinary diversity that is normal in motor skill acquisition. Indeed, motor development provides an important domain for evaluating cultural challenges to a general behavioral science.

From a Levinasian perspective, the interaction between two people is an ethical encounter, a face-to-face interaction that calls the subject into question and renders them vulnerable to the ritual of rupture. But what if your embodiment renders you, in the moment of encounter, less than human? How can we bring the imperative of pre-ontological responsibility to bear on the present moment, fractured as we are in our understandings of embodiment and the hauntings of history? In this paper, I hope to (...) respond to the previous question by articulating the problems and possibilities of Levinas’s thought in conversation with urgent considerations of racially-bodied Others. To begin, I briefly explore critiques of Levinas’s Eurocentrism. Then, drawing on the concept of incarnate historiography, I examine the difficulties of skin as “seen.” Next, I elaborate the prospect of how diachronous time affords a second register that takes seriously the historical experience of pain and oppression as responsibility. Finally, I argue that the recognition of responsibility is essential to education, proposing pedagogy that preserves alterity and makes space for the new. (shrink)

The hard problem of consciousness lies in explaining what constitutes the subjectivity of consciousness. I argue that significant headway can be made on the problem from an embodied mind view, and particularly if we turn to William James’ theory of emotions. The challenge is one of explaining how bodily subjectivity arises from biological processes. I argue that the solution to this problem lies in our sense of interoception, and James’ theory which suggests emotional feelings are the cascade of changing bodily (...) states. Through James’ account, I show how the biological body can give rise to a bodily subjectivity in experiential consciousness, and thus move towards a solution of the hard problem. (shrink)

Our emotional states affect how we perceive the world. If I am stressed, annoyed, or irritated, I might experience the sound of children laughing and screaming as they play around the house in a negative manner — it is unpleasant, loud, piercing, and so on. Yet, if I’m in a relaxed, happy, loving mood, the very same sounds might be experienced as pleasant, playful, warm, and so on. The sounds being made by the children are the same in both cases, (...) but how they are experienced differs. The auditory experience is affected by the emotional state that I am in. I perceive the sounds differently depending on how I’m feeling. Although this might at first seem to be a trivial observation, it certainly is not. We take for granted that our perceptual experiences give rise to justified beliefs and knowledge. Thus, if my perceptual experience of an object can differ based on my emotional state, and I take my perceptual experience to justify my beliefs and even lead to knowledge, then we might have a problem. If emotions — which are not fixed and in large part uncontrolled — affect our ability to accurately perceive the world, then they may undermine the justified beliefs and knowledge gained on the basis of our perceptual experience of the world. My goal here is to explore this potential problem. -/- I consider how we might understand the effect that emotions have on the justification of our perceptual beliefs about the world, beliefs that we acquire from a variety of sensory modalities — audition, gustation olfaction, and so on. I take the problem to be associated with one of two forms of perceptual influence: penetration or multisensory integration. In any given perceptual moment there are multiple sensory modalities and mental states at play, each affecting the overall experience. Whether we understand the influence of emotion on perception as a form of non-perceptual penetration or a form of non-visual sensory perception of the inner body — interoception — the potential epistemological difficulties remain: how can we be said to acquire justified beliefs and knowledge on the basis of such influenced perceptual experience. As has been the norm, only the five exteroceptive senses of vision, audition, olfaction, taste and touch are typically discussed in the context of sensory perception. However, as I argue, there is strong reason to accept the claim that emotional experience is a form of interoception, and that interoception ought to be considered when discussing sensory perception. In this way, then, I propose that clarifying the role played by interoception in sense perception across modalities is necessary if we are to make progress on the epistemological problems at hand. (shrink)

Education has a responsibility to respond to the threat of deteriorating democracies. The post-truth era is marked by an erosion of trust in public institutions and extreme polarisation. This paper begins with an examination of the ways by which current literacy and media literacy education is not simply outmoded, but also limited by a grounding in neoliberal conceptions of rationality and individualism. Offering a counterpoint to the status quo, and foregrounding the significance of affect, I work with Levinas’s conception of (...) ethics to illustrate the tensions between affective reactionism and non-intentional affectivity, enjoyment and its disruption as a premise for intersubjectivity, and contrasting manifestations of anger. I conclude the paper with a proposal for literacy education that comprises intentional focus on relationality, responsibility, and affect. (shrink)

Cognitive sciences as an interdisciplinary field, involving scientific disciplines (such as computer science, linguistics, psychology, neuroscience, economics, etc.), philosophical disciplines (philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, analytic philosophy, etc.) and engineering (notably knowledge engineering), have a vast theoretical and practical content, some even conflicting. In this interdisciplinary context and on computational modeling, ontologies play a crucial role in communication between disciplines and also in a process of innovation of theories, models and experiments in cognitive sciences. We propose a model for (...) this process here. An ontological commitment is advocated as the framework of a scientific realism, which leads computational modeling to search for more realistic models, for a complex systems perspective of nature and cognition. In that way multiagent modeling of complex systems has been fulfilling an important role. (shrink)

This paper explores the concept of time in education. It argues that the neoliberal capitalist construct of time as a resource to be deployed in service of labour—ever-accelerating—has permeated education, with implications for curriculum, teaching, and learning. To slow the effects of neoliberal capitalism in schools requires a reconsideration of time that permits both different understandings of how time is encountered and different values orienting how one spends one’s time. Using Hägglund’s argument for finitude and Levinas’ idea of time as (...) a gift, the paper articulates the philosophical rationale and pedagogical implications for making the most of one’s educational time. (shrink)

Our emotional states affect how we perceive the world. If I am stressed, annoyed, or irritated, I might experience the sound of children laughing and screaming as they play around the house in a negative manner — it is unpleasant, loud, piercing, and so on. Yet, if I’m in a relaxed, happy, loving mood, the very same sounds might be experienced as pleasant, playful, warm, and so on. The sounds being made by the children are the same in both cases, (...) but how they are experienced differs. The auditory experience is affected by the emotional state that I am in. I perceive the sounds differently depending on how I’m feeling. Although this might at first seem to be a trivial observation, it certainly is not. We take for granted that our perceptual experiences give rise to justified beliefs and knowledge. Thus, if my perceptual experience of an object can differ based on my emotional state, and I take my perceptual experience to justify my beliefs and even lead to knowledge, then we might have a problem. If emotions — which are not fixed and in large part uncontrolled — affect our ability to accurately perceive the world, then they may undermine the justified beliefs and knowledge gained on the basis of our perceptual experience of the world. My goal here is to explore this potential problem. -/- I consider how we might understand the effect that emotions have on the justification of our perceptual beliefs about the world, beliefs that we acquire from a variety of sensory modalities — audition, gustation olfaction, and so on. I take the problem to be associated with one of two forms of perceptual influence: penetration or multisensory integration. In any given perceptual moment there are multiple sensory modalities and mental states at play, each affecting the overall experience. Whether we understand the influence of emotion on perception as a form of non-perceptual penetration or a form of non-visual sensory perception of the inner body — interoception — the potential epistemological difficulties remain: how can we be said to acquire justified beliefs and knowledge on the basis of such influenced perceptual experience. As has been the norm, only the five exteroceptive senses of vision, audition, olfaction, taste and touch are typically discussed in the context of sensory perception. However, as I argue, there is strong reason to accept the claim that emotional experience is a form of interoception, and that interoception ought to be considered when discussing sensory perception. In this way, then, I propose that clarifying the role played by interoception in sense perception across modalities is necessary if we are to make progress on the epistemological problems at hand. (shrink)

The gambler's fallacy and hot hand were studied in predictions about outcomes of coin tosses. A critical trial occurred when participants made predictions after a “run” of four heads or tails. Participants' attention was manipulated to focus on the person flipping the coin, the coin, or neither (control group) as a possible cause of the run. We also manipulated whether or not there was a change in who tossed the coin. In the control condition the standard reversal was observed (gambler's (...) fallacy); however, when participants focused on the person, and it was that same person who conducted the run and critical coin toss, more people chose in the direction of continuation (hot hand). Directing attention to the person tossing the run seemed to prompt participants to behave as if that individual was “hot” in terms of getting a specific outcome (e.g., heads), as if by sympathetic magic, thus eliminating the gambler's fallacy. (shrink)

The paper addresses the particular modality of the end, which is manifested in a pervasive sense of constant, immediate, and real threat from the total destruction of the planet, global conflicts, and the extinction of the human species (viruses and pandemics, natural disasters, the nuclear threat, and the threat of artificial intelligence). The theme of the end is introduced by presenting the most important and current eschatological theories of radical political-philosophical thought, especially those of the left-wing, post-Marxist province. These include (...) the work of W. Benjamin, J. Taubes, G. Agamben, S. Žižek and A. Badiou, who derive their political theology from St. Paul. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate how the most radical political thinkers, in a context where the emancipatory potential of concepts that could provide a framework for political continuity in times of crisis has been exhausted, turn to an ephemeral, otherworldly realm where political hope is constructed on theological concepts. In the concluding section, the paper puts forth the argument that the avoidance of the end is contingent upon the postulation of the political emancipatory potential in theological terms. This entails the imbuing of the aforementioned potential with theological concepts such as renunciation, self-control, and self-sacrifice. (shrink)

This study investigated the emotional and behavioural effects of looming threats using both recalled (self-reported valence) and real-time response measurements (facial expressions). The looming bias refers to the tendency to underestimate the time of arrival of rapidly approaching (looming) stimuli, providing additional time for defensive reactions. While previous research has shown negative emotional responses to looming threats based on self-reports after stimulus exposure, facial expressions offer valuable insights into emotional experiences and non-verbal behaviour during stimulus exposure. A face reading experiment (...) examined responses to threats in motion, considering stimulus direction (looming versus receding motion) and threat strength (more versus less threatening stimuli). We also explored the added value of facial expression recognition compared to self-reported valence. Results indicated that looming threats elicit more negative facial expressions than receding threats, supporting previous findings on the looming bias. Further, more (vs. less) threatening stimuli evoked more negative facial expressions, but only when the threats were looming rather than receding. Interestingly, facial expressions of valence and self-reported valence showed opposing results, suggesting the importance of incorporating facial expression recognition to understand defensive responses to looming threats more comprehensively. (shrink)

The text attempts to rethink the concept of emancipation and how it is structured as political action, while describing its historical origins and how it is further understood by the three important political philosophers: Karl Marx, Hannah Arendt, and Jacques Rancière. All three of them – specifically and with substantial differences – understand politics as a space for political action that leads to emancipation in the name of equality. In order to determine the historical origin of the concept in more (...) detail, the argumentation of the text rely upon its elaboration within the school of “conceptual history”, which deals with the historical semantics of terms and sees the etymology of and the change in the meaning of terms as forming a crucial basis for a contemporary cultural, conceptual, and linguistic understanding, and afterwards it links this “pre-history” with Marx’s, Arendt’s, and Rancière’s understanding of the concept of emancipation, and see how they differ and are related to each other, considering what theoretical conclusions about the concept of emancipation we can take from these relations. Particular interest is aimed at how the concept of emancipation is perceived today, who the subject of emancipation is, what the method and final goal of emancipation is, and, finally, how these understandings can help us in the present time when it seems that we need emancipation more than ever. (shrink)

The Venezuelan migration crisis has displaced over six million people and is the Americas’ largest forced migration. Nearby countries have received the majority of the displaced and initially showed an impressive welcome to Venezuelans, regardless of whether they may be considered migrants, asylum seekers, or refugees. However, host country responses have mainly been uncoordinated, siloed, and impromptu. This paper examines the solidarities and tensions within the individual country responses of Venezuela’s closest Latin American and Andean neighbors: Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Chile, (...) and Brazil. The number of displaced people leaving Venezuela has steadily increased since 2015 yet limited long term-planning and inclusion of migrants in host communities has led to a growth in xenophobia. Additionally, many Latin American host nations have erected new barriers that make legal entry or residency forms more difficult for migrants to obtain. The COVID-19 pandemic has compounded these issues as host countries grapple with supporting and offering resources to their citizens in addition to migrants. However, some promising regional solutions could be applied in a more coordinated regional approach to help ensure that host countries and IOs supporting them can better extend enduring solidarity and inclusion to Venezuelans. These solutions include longer-term visa options, such as the new Colombian 10-year visa, that can help regularize and include Venezuelans over a prolonged period. A particularly recommended approach would be the regional application of an inventive Latin America humanitarian-orientated accord, the Cartagena Declaration, a forward-thinking concept with a potential that has never been realized. The Cartagena Declaration could offer more comprehensive protection and fairer access to rights beyond temporary measures. (shrink)

"The aim of this contribution is to study three central revisions that Habermas has carried out in the course of developing his theory of communicative action, together with some of the criticisms raised by those revisions. A reflection is suggested concerning whether Habermas’ project of grounding a critical theory of society on communicative action is definitively threatened after those revisions.".

In “What is the state-of-the-art on lucid dreaming? Recent advances and ques- tions for future research”, Ursula Voss and Allan Hobson provide a detailed view of the features characterizing lucid dreaming and put forward four innovative hy- potheses to explain why and how lucid dreaming occurs, as well as how lucid dream states are related to other states of consciousness. Their aim is to show that not only is there benefit to studying lucid dreaming in itself, as this would give (...) us a deeper understanding of dream consciousness, but also that it is an im- portant endeavor because of the kind of conscious state lucid dreaming is. To be sure, Voss and Hobson make important in-roads into the empirical study of lucid dreaming that ought to sprout new and exciting research in the area. As I will show, however, there remains much conceptual work to be done. In this comment- ary I tease out three aspects of Voss and Hobson’s view that would greatly bene- fit from philosophical consideration. First, I highlight the lingering confusion with what exactly insight is, and I point to how one might go about clarifying this no- tion. Second, I argue that our understanding of insight and meta-awareness in lu- cid dreaming could be greatly increased by looking at how these concepts are used and understood in relation to meditative states. Last, I explore the role of the body in lucid dreaming and argue that one’s bodily awareness in lucid dreams is far more multi-faceted than at it might at first seem. (shrink)

Experiential consciousness is characterized by subjectivity: There is something it is like to be a subject of experience – a first-personal perspective, a what-it-is-like-for-me. In this paper I defend two proposals. First, I contend that to understand the subjectivity of consciousness we must turn to the subject: we are embodied sub- jects of experience. Thus, I argue, the subjectivity of experiential consciousness should be understood as a bodily subjectivity. Sec- ond, if we take this approach, I propose that we can (...) finally begin to explain the structure of experiential consciousness as subjective by looking at certain bodily processes in particular interoception. (shrink)

Ante al auge en la segunda mitad del siglo XX de la crítica a la Modernidad, surgen en el pensamiento continental un nuevo paradigma filosófico que intenta reconstruir aquel proyecto ilustrado de forma renovada. Es la obra de K.-O. Apel y J. Habermas un exponente claro de dicho proyecto. Ambos se proponen hablar de una ética del discurso como respuesta a la necesidad de poner en valor una racionalidad universal. Sin embargo, surgen diferencias de matiz sobre la fundamentación de dicha (...) ética. El problema de “lo incondicionado” no escapa al mismo Front the rise in the critics of the Modernity in the second half of the 20th century, a new philosofical approach appears, in the continental thinking. This approach tryes to reconstruct the enlighted project in a new way. The works of K.-O. Apel and J. Habermas are clears exponents of this project. Both authors try to propose a discursive ethics as a response to the need of putting in value an universal rationality. However, there are important differences on the foundations on their proposals. The problem about “the unconditioned” is an example of those differences. (shrink)

This paper makes a case for love as a powerful force for ‘transforming power’ in our educational institutions and everyday lives, and proposes that ‘revolutionary love’ serves as a moral and strategic compass for concrete individual and collective actions in critical education. The paper begins by reviewing current conceptualizations of love in critical education and identifies the potential for further theorization of the concept of love. It continues by theorizing love as a transformational political concept, focusing on six different perspectives (...) about love; love as an emotion, love as choice, and love as response, love as relational, love as political, and love as praxis. The paper concludes by discussing what “transforming power” with a “loving revolution” could mean for educators who engage with critical education. (shrink)